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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE   
Since independence in 1991, the Central Asian states have become a focus of 
international interest both because of the abundance of oil reserves and their proximity to 
the Middle East.  This thesis will examine the potential role of the United States and 
Russia in creating and maintaining stability in the five nations of Central Asia in three 
critical areas: regional conflict (stemming from border disputes, water distribution issues, 
and natural resource concerns), containing Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and the 
economic situation. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, fully a decade after the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
United States had no military bases in the region.  Business and government personnel 
within the United States have long been interested in Central Asia because of the energy 
resources located under the Caspian Sea Basin.  Since 1991, U.S. businesses have been 
able to operate there. 
After September 11, 2001, the United States developed relationships with each of 
the Central Asian countries with the goal of establishing basing rights and over-flight 
permission to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  These relationships 
continue to exist today and have expanded beyond the short-term objective of basing 
rights.  Military-to-military exchanges and training have increased and Central Asian 
countries are using U.S. assistance, as well as financial and military expertise, in their 
fight against terrorism. 
Russia considers Central Asia as its “near-abroad” and, therefore, within its 
sphere of influence.  Russian influence, however, has decreased in this region due to a 
variety of Russian domestic concerns, and because Moscow’s foreign policy has not 
consistently focused on Central Asia until recently.  Russia, however, has belatedly 
recognized the need to increase involvement in Central Asia, in the interest of the 
stability of newly independent States. 
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Experts debate whether U.S. presence is beneficial for the region.  One school 
represented by Doulatbek Khidirbekughli and Roger McDermott, argues that U.S. 
presence in Central Asia has a stabilizing effect, especially as it reduces incidence of 
terrorism in the region.1  An opposing view articulated by Shahram Akbarzadeh and 
Niklas Swanstrom states that the U.S. presence in Central Asia undermines long-term 
stability, which comes from the ability of states to generate stable political cultures.2 
Obviously, the existence and viability of terrorist organizations in Central Asia is 
of great concern both to the United States and Russia.  At present, Washington is 
pursuing three strategic objectives in Central Asia: 
1. Security:  assisting with anti-terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and 
narco-trafficking. 
2. Energy:  the safe transit of oil and gas directly affects energy 
revenues and contributes to the economic growth in Central Asia.  
3. Political Reform:  by promoting democracy, the United States 
hopes to improve human rights, strengthen political liberties, and increase 
tolerance.3 
 
Roger McDermott argues that the United States must remain in the region to 
support efforts against terrorism and assist fledgling governments in their development as 
independent states.4  This sentiment is echoed by several Central Asian scholars, as well 
as the United States Congress’ Committee on International Relations, which states that 
the United States should establish a presence in the region to provide stability and assist 
in the building of democratic institutions.5 
 
 
                                                 
1 Roger N. McDermott. “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1992-2002: Threats, 
Influences and Reform.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies (2003): 27-50. 
2 Shahram Akbarzadeh. “Keeping Central Asia Stable.” Third World Quarterly (2004): 689-705; 
Swanström, Niklas. “The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in 
Central Asia.” Central Asian Survey (2004): 41-53. 
3 U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on International Relations. Central Asia: Terrorism, 
Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. United States: Congress House, 2003. 
4 Roger N. McDermott. “Countering Global Terrorism: Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of the 
Central Asian Militaries.” Strategic Studies Institute (2004): p. V. 
5 U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, p. 3. 
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B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY   
What does International Relations theory tell us about U.S. and Russian towards 
Central Asia?  This thesis contends that U.S. and Russian policies towards Central Asia 
can best be explained relying on the theoretical framework of realism; however, while 
U.S. actions are consistent with offensive realism, Russian actions fit better with 
defensive realism.  Understanding the motivating factors behind the U.S. and Russian 
cooperation with Central Asia is important in assessing future regional stability. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in several 
engagements throughout the world:  Iraq (1991, 2003), Kosovo, Serbia, and Afghanistan.  
These U.S. engagements illustrate Christopher Layne’s argument regarding strategy of 
preponderance by demonstrating the United States’ need for additional power.6  This 
notion of the United States strategy of preponderance is echoed by Douglas Lemke, 
whereby he argues that the United States continues its desire for more power by 
expanding into post-Soviet areas (e.g., Central Asia), in its quest to be the strongest 
country in the world.7  Lemke also states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) is a U.S. tool being used in its policy of offensive realism, aiding the United 
States in its expansion and ultimately assisting with the global war on terrorism by 
countering Islamic fundamentalism.8   
Layne and Lemke both state that if the United States continues to be the global 
hegemony, and there remains a disparity among states regarding power, then the potential 
for conflict is avoided.  The United States must remain markedly stronger in its global 
hegemonic role to avoid potential conflict and prevent confrontation and increase of 
global opposition.9  Additional evidence supporting the stance of offensive realism is 
Russia’s attempts at coalition building in Central Asia (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and relations with China); this fulfills offensive realism’s predictions that 
                                                 
6 Christopher Layne. “The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise.” International Security, 
Vol. 17 No.4 (1993): 5-51. 
7 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Editors. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in 
the 21st Century. California: Stanford University Press (2004): 55. 
8 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Editors, p. 68. 
9 Ibid, p. 57&105. 
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other actors will attempt to balance the power of the hegemony.10  According to offensive 
realism, the Central Asian states should accept the role of the United States as a global 
hegemon and “bandwagon” with it for economic gain and to obtain regional stability.11 
The Central Asian states not only have to deal with the United States as the global 
hegemon, but must also interact with Russian regional hegemony.  Russia’s actions 
regarding Central Asia can be explained by using the framework of defensive realism in 
International Relations theory.  Russia was interested in Central Asia during the Imperial 
era as well as during its Soviet past; it has had an ongoing desire to be the regional 
hegemon.  Russia still is trying to remain the hegemon in Central Asia and is concerned 
with the U.S. influence in the region.  Balance of power theory is evident when noting 
Russia’s attempts to form relationships with Central Asian countries, China, and Iran, in 
its effort to balance against U.S. unipolarity.12  An example of this cooperation is the 
recent SCO meeting, which led to Uzbekistan terminating the United States lease on 
Karshi-Kanabad (K2), and the request for the removal of all U.S. forces.  President 
Karimov’s decision to end the lease happened soon after the United States criticized 
Uzbekistan’s human rights violations that occurred during the events at Andijan.  Russia 
is so concerned with the balance of power in the region, that it saw the encroaching U.S. 
bases as threats to its role as the regional hegemony.  Russia is not trying to balance itself 
against the United States in any other region of the world, thereby illustrating that it is not 
behaving in a defensive, rather than offensive model of realism.  If Russia were to try to 
stop NATO’s expansion, or even if it had assisted Iraq with a counterattack against the 
United States in 2003, then its mode of operation would be considered offensive realism, 
as it would be pursuing a policy of expansion; however, Russia neither fought NATO 
enlargement nor allied with Iraq.13  
C. RESEARCH/METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will rely primarily on secondary sources for the most current literature 
and arguments regarding stability issues in the region. Scholarly journals, such as Central 
                                                 
10 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Editors, p. 55. 
11 Christopher Layne. “The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise.” International Security, 
Vol. 17 No.4 (1993): 5-51. 
12 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Editors, p. 217. 
13 Ibid, p. 62. 
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Asian Survey, Third World Quarterly, and The Review of International Affairs will be 
used. To track the trends in terrorism the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 
will be used extensively, as this source provides news reports from the Central Asian 
countries.  These regional sources should provide the insight needed to assess the current 
strength of terrorist groups in the region.  FBIS will be also used to aid in the 
understanding of the current sentiment of the local governments and indigenous 
populations regarding U.S. and Russian presence in the region.  Internet sources, such as 
Eurasianet.org and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, will be used for current events.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II will examine the most significant causes for regional instability such as 
border conflict, water distribution concerns, and energy issues.  The former Soviet Union 
drew the borders in Central Asia without regard to geographic or ethnic considerations.  
The goal was to lessen the likelihood of separatism.  Since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the Central Asian States must deal with this legacy of territorial disputes and 
ethnic tensions.  There also has been a significant increase in friction between the 
“upstream” and “downstream” countries in Central Asia over water rights. For example, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the “upstream” countries in Central Asia, provide 80 percent 
of all water to the Aral Sea Basin.  A potential trigger point for conflict is the fact that the 
“downstream” countries (i.e., Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), rely on this 
water as the major source for irrigation of their cash crops (i.e., cotton and rice).14  Since 
the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Central Asia, there has  
been little progress in replacing the system of management that existed under the 
communist regime with a new cooperative management system directing water usage 
throughout the Central Asian states. 
The reasons for a resurgence of radical Islam in Central Asia are fiercely debated.  
Students of Central Asia advance three theories to explain this phenomenon:  
political/religious oppression, economic depression, and the post-Soviet ideological void 
that has been filled by outsiders espousing fundamentalist ideas.  Chapter III will argue 
that the current regimes in Central Asia are unable to deal effectively with these three 
                                                 
14 International Crisis Group. “Central Asia: Water and Conflict,” ICG Asia Report No. 34 (30 May 
2002): 2. 
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trends on their own, and that terrorism will remain a serious threat to regional stability.  
In fact, because of their lack of experience with democracy, the Central Asian countries 
will continue to be seriously challenged by Islamic fundamentalism unless they seek the 
support of the United States and Russia.     
An analysis of the two major terrorist organizations in the region will assess the 
level and significance of the threat in Central Asia.  The Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan is the most active violent terrorist organization in the region at present.  
Although a nonviolent Islamic fundamentalist organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, may 
prove a far greater danger in the long run because it espouses a distorted view of Islam.   
Chapter IV will explore the economic relationships that currently exist between 
the Central Asian States and the United States and Russia, as well as assess the impact of 
current and future financial assistance on regional stability.  Current investments by the 
United States and Russia will be studied to gauge trends that may contribute to stability.  
A large portion of this chapter will focus on the natural resource wealth that this region 
possesses and how both the United States and Russia have interacted with the Central 
Asian States to development and exploitation of their resources.    
By examining the regional issues that confront the Central Asian states in their 
quest for stability, this thesis will attempt to assess whether outside assistance is the key 
to success.  Can the United States and/or Russia help Central Asia to confront its 
problems, most notably the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, or might the U.S. and 
Russian presence hinder stability?  Last, this chapter will provide policy 
recommendations for both the United States and Russia in their respective interactions 




Figure 1.   Map of Central Asia.15 
                                                 
15 Indiana University Website (http://www.indiana.edu/~afghan/maps/central_asia_map_1999.gif, 


























II. REGIONAL FLASHPOINTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is a debate among experts on Central Asia regarding the potential 
stabilizing influence of the local presence of the United States and Russia.  One school of 
thought suggests that outside assistance and presence in Central Asia is having a positive 
impact on stability and the fight against terrorism in the region.16  An opposing view 
holds that the United States and Russia are not now and will not ever contribute to long-
term stability (e.g., U.S. and Russian forces in Central Asia), as regional stability needs to 
come first from within the states themselves; only then, it is believed, should outside aide 
be accepted.17 
With regard to security in Central Asia, the U.S. currently has approximately 
4,000 personnel based in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, supporting the Global 
War on Terrorism.  According to Roger McDermott, the United States needs to remain in 
the region to support efforts against terrorism and to assist fledgling governments in their 
development as young independent states.18  This sentiment is echoed by several Central 
Asian scholars, as well as the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International 
Relations, which itself states that the United States should remain in the region providing 
stability, and should assist with the implementation of democratic institutions therein.19   
Russia maintains a military presence in Central Asia with approximately 7,800 




                                                 
16Doulatbek Khidirbekughli. “U.S. Geostrategy in Central Asia: A Kazakh Perspective.” Comparative 
Strategy (2003): 159-167; Roger N. McDermott. “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1992-
2002: Threats, Influences and Reform.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies (2003): 27-50.  
17Niklas Swanström. “The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in 
Central Asia.” Central Asian Survey (2004): 41-53.  
18Roger N. McDermott. “Countering Global Terrorism: Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of 
the Central Asian Militaries.” Strategic Studies Institute (2004). 
19 U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations. Central Asia: Terrorism, 
Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. United States: Congress House, 2003: 3. 
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and approximately 300 - 700 in Kyrgyzstan, located at Kant Airfield.  Russia also 
believes it needs to remain in the region to assist with counterterrorism, especially with 
regard to cross border incursions.20   
Regarding the use and transportation of water, there has been a significant 
increase in the friction between the individual countries of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, the “upstream” countries, provide 80 percent of all water to the entire Aral Sea 
Basin.  A potential trigger point for conflict is the fact that the “downstream” countries, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, rely on this water as their major source for 
irrigation of their cash crops (i.e., cotton and rice).21  Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, there has been little progress in replacing Moscow’s system of management with, 
for example, a new cooperative management team directing water usage throughout the 
Central Asian states.  Prior to actual conflict erupting between these relatively new 
Central Asian states, some type of intervention is needed to correct this potentially 
serious dilemma.  Management of water control must be addressed in order to lessen 
existing tensions and lay the groundwork for modernization of existing dams and the 
construction of new dams.   
When the Soviet Union constructed the borders in Central Asia, it did so without 
regard to geographic or ethnic considerations; in fact, it created an area that would be less 
likely to harbor future separatists movements.  Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
the Central Asian States have had to clarify and define their borders with ever-present 
controversial factors such as:  frequent historical claims, ethnic tension considerations, 
the unilateral redrawing of borders, and domestic political demands.  In addition to these 
aforementioned factors, there is the exacerbating issue of cross-border incursions by 





                                                 
20 Jim Nichol. “Central Asia:  Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code IB93108, (17 August, 2005): 1-16. 
21 International Crisis Group. “Central Asia: Water and Conflict,” ICG Asia Report No. 34 (30 May 
2002): 2. 
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country, and retreat to the relative safety of another country, which may harbor them 
unknowingly.22 This situation emphasizes the necessity of increased border controls 
within a regional context.         
B. WATER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION 
Prior to Central Asia’s independence in 1991, Moscow’s Ministry of Land 
Reclamation and Water Management was responsible for setting the guidelines and 
quotas for the region.  It can be argued that the previous centralized approach to water 
management led directly to some of the current problems in Central Asia.  Under 
Moscow’s management, the Aral Sea was the fourth largest lake in the world, and the 
evidence indicates that the level of water was already decreasing.  The Aral Sea is now 
half its former size, with a water level loss between 40 and 55 feet, and an increase in 
salinity level of eight times, which in turn has led to increased health problems through 
out the area.23   
Central Asia has attempted to adopt a cohesive water strategy through several 
bilateral and regional agreements in the last decade.  In 1991 all the states agreed to 
maintain the Soviet system of water allocations in order to prevent the development of a 
crisis.  The Almaty Agreement signed in 1992 by the Central Asian states formalized this 
plan.  One of the results of this agreement was the establishment of the Interstate 
Coordination Water Commission (ICWC), which was given the authority to implement 
water quotas, train officials, and maintain all records regarding water management in the 
region.  The Almaty Agreement based its management system on the Soviet model, 
giving larger quotas to the three largest countries (i.e., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan), and fewer to the smaller populations of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  For 
example, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were allocated 88 percent of the quotas from the 
Syr Darya River (Uzbekistan 51 percent and Kazakhstan 37 percent).24  This inequity has  
 
 
                                                 
22 Bishek Kabar News Agency (FBIS Report). “Uzbek Islamic Opposition Training Fighters in 
Afghanistan,” 16 February 2000; Dushane Khabar Nama (FBIS Report). “Afghanistan:  ‘Fighters Going to 
Uzbekistan Through Taleban in Kunduz,” 30 March 2001. 
23 International Crisis Group. ICG Asia Report No. 34, p. 6 
24 Ibid, p. 12. 
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led to complaints and overuse by the smaller countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.   In 
addition to unfair allocations, the headquarters of the ICWC operation in Uzbekistan has 
often created strife among the states. 
Bilateral agreements exist between the countries; for example, in 1998 
Kyrgyzstan agreed to allow more water flow to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in return for 
natural gas and coal.  These bilateral agreements may offer short-term solutions and 
necessary resources to the states, but there is no permanent allocation system in effect for 
continued management of the water.  According to the International Crisis Group, water 
consumption in 2002 was one and a half times more than what Central Asia should be 
consuming and has only worsened over the last several years.25   
With water consumption increasing at a frightening pace, another worrisome 
trend throughout Central Asia is the agricultural policy.  Current policies do not limit 
growers’ production based on water limitations; in fact, the policy has been to continue 
increasing production regardless of the environmental impact.  One of the concerns 
regarding agricultural irrigation has been the inefficient distribution of water, wherein 50 
percent of the irrigation water is lost when it is routed through outdated infrastructure.26  
This gross waste of water continues to go unchecked by the Central Asian states, which 
rely heavily on it for agricultural production and follow-on revenue by exports to foreign 
markets.    
The very concept of managing water is new for the Central Asian countries.  The 
pressure for even more water from the downstream countries (i.e., Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) will of course continue, as indicated by the increase in 
irrigated land in these countries by 7 percent between 1995-2000.  Each of the Central 
Asian countries is individually planning further expansion, without consideration for 
regional issues, and with complete disregard for potential nation-to-nation conflict.  
Uzbekistan’s use of irrigation for 95 percent of its crop production (28 percent of its 
GDP) is yet another illustration of the importance of water management.  Turkmenistan, 
in fact, plans to triple its cotton production in the next five years, which clearly will 
                                                 
25 International Crisis Group. ICG Asia Report No. 34, p. 1-4. 
26 Ibid, p. 30. 
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require substantially more water than it is using already.  These examples emphasize the 
importance of water control in Central Asia and demonstrate, as well, a potential 
flashpoint for years to come.27   
Due to mismanagement of water, altercations have occurred in Central Asia.  In 
2000, Uzbekistan failed to provide natural gas to Kyrgyzstan, leading to Kyrgyzstan’s 
modifying the 1992 water allocation agreement.  This agreement stated that the Central 
Asian countries would maintain the same water flow standards as they did under the 
Soviet system, but the understanding ostensibly was that Uzbekistan was to provide 
natural gas for the winter months in order to decrease Kyrgyzstan’s use of 
hydroelectricity.  When Uzbekistan failed to deliver gas, Kyrgyzstan provided adequate 
energy to its own population by allowing for increased flow on the reservoir, which in 
turn flooded Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley.28   
Kyrgyzstan is allowing up to 60 percent of the Toktogul Reservoir’s water to flow 
out in the winter causing huge portions of Uzbekistan’s most fertile region to be flooded, 
which is creating unproductive growing areas for the following season.  The Toktogul 
Reservoir is located in Kyrgyzstan on the Syr Darya River and is the source for the 
irrigation of the Uzbek agricultural sector.29  Kyrgyzstan depends on the Toktogul 
Reservoir to provide energy needs during the winter months to its population, increasing 
electricity production 20 percent since 1991.  Kyrgyzstan is unable to provide much 
needed improvements to the Reservoir assisting with inefficient energy production, and 
with an annual maintenance bill of $15-27 million US Dollars, these modernizations will 
not occur.30  
Unfortunately, competition for water is intensifying every year with the increase 
in population in Central Asia, leading to continued stability issues.  The Syr Darya River 
flows from Kyrgyzstan through Tajikistan, and then through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
on its route to the Aral Sea.  The other major river, the Amu Darya, passes through three 
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countries, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, on its path to the Aral Sea.  These 
two rivers are controlled by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which make up approximately 20 
percent of the Central Asian land area, but these rivers create approximately 80 percent of 
the region’s water supply.  Without proper management and with these two countries 
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), the smallest of the five in Central Asia, controlling the 
majority of the water distribution, conflict is inevitable.31     
C. BORDER DISPUTES 
After independence in 1991, the Central Asian states accepted the administrative 
borders of the Soviet era, instead of making historical claims based on either ethnicity or 
clan.  The borders in Central Asia changed frequently throughout its history, with various 
Khanates occupying territories, and could have been a legitimate basis for territorial 
changes by the newly independent Central Asian states.  This re-forming of borders did 
not come to fruition, however, as Central Asia was forced first to focus on internal 
governance (prior to border demarcation issues).   
During the late 1990s Islamic fundamentalists crossed the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan 
border, shedding light on the impending problems of border demarcation and the lack of 
border security.  These Islamic fundamentalists (aka, terrorists) crossed borders at will to 
operate in neighboring countries, causing discontent among the governments and 
population by raiding and attacking government and local institutions.  In an effort to 
restrict movement, Uzbekistan responded to these raids on its territory by placing land 
mines along the border with Tajikistan.  The use of land mines on the border also had a 
negative effect on the population by limiting travel of local citizens and local businesses, 
stifling trade between the two countries.32  Terrorists crossing borders, as seen with the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members in the late 1990s, pose a significant threat to 
border stability, as they conduct operations in one country only to be safe-housed in a 
neighboring one.  This unrestricted movement can lead to one country’s pursuing the 
terrorists without regard to border claims.  Chapter three explains in further detail the 
matter of Islamic fundamentalism and the cross-border concerns. 
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In addition to this phenomenon of cross border incursion by terrorists, the Central 
Asian states had to contend with Russia’s announcement in August 2000 that it had 
withdrawn from the 1992 Bishkek Accord, which allowed for visa-free travel throughout 
the Commonwealth of Independent States.  Moscow stated that security concerns with 
terrorist crossing borders unchecked, as well as narco-trafficking, were the reasons for 
this withdrawal resulting in the introduction of checkpoints along Russia’s borders.33 
The Central Asian States continue to have issues regarding regional border 
demarcation, resulting in border disputes; the potential also exists for more serious 
military conflict.  The Central Asian countries have been affected economically by such 
disputes, with several barriers to trade existing throughout the region.  For example, the 
high price of a visa and the increased difficulty in obtaining one has had a serious effect 
on cross-border trade, with significant slowing down or ceasing all together of trade.  
This situation is compounded by the fact that Customs officers and Border guards often 
are corrupt, harassing businessmen and traders who must cross the border, making it 
prohibitively costly as well as burdensome for profitable trade.  The overall trade 
between the Central Asian states has risen only slightly over the last decade, indicating a 
slow rate of growth, in part, due to regional disputes.  These disputes prevent increased 
trade, which would lead to increased revenue among the Central Asian states.34  The 
economic factors in the region are further explored in chapter four of this thesis and 
provide an in-depth look at regional trade as well as trade between Central Asia and the 
United States and Russia.  
In addition to the increasingly troubled economic situation in Central Asia, there 
are other issues to consider.  The ethnic minorities located in each of the different 
countries are a constant concern for possible military conflict, if they (i.e., the minorities), 
perceive themselves as threatened.  Uzbekistan poses a particular challenge, and probably 
the most controversial, regarding ethnic minorities, as its Ferghana Valley borders 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Figure 2).  This fertile valley was the center in Central Asia 
for the infrastructure during the Soviet days, and it still maintains its economic 
importance for agriculture and trade routes.  There are several enclaves in the Ferghana 
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Valley, which are isolated from their countries and pose a serious risk for flashpoints of 
conflict.  Tajikistan’s Varukh enclave, with approximately 30-40 thousand people, is 
located in Kyrgyzstan and essentially is cut-off from Tajikistan.  Another example of 
potential conflict is Uzbekistan’s Sokh and Shakhimardan enclaves located in 
Kyrgyzstan.  These enclaves pose a challenge to all three countries, as visa restrictions 
and border crossing have hindered any reasonable travel and trade in the areas mentioned 
above.  With mined borders and stringent visa regulations it is almost impossible for 
locals to visit family members only miles away and in their respective countries.  
Traditional trade routes are now blocked by border checkpoints not only in the enclaves, 




Figure 2.   Map of Ferghana Valley.36 
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For reasons outlined above, Russia’s interest in Central Asia with regard to 
solving border disputes should be raised to higher level in Moscow’s policy, not only for 
the sake of Russian Diasporas, but also for the sake of Russian businesses and 
shareholders investing in the region.  Currently, Russian businesses control 44 percent of 
the Caspian pipeline consortium, which runs from Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk and is 
capable of carrying 560,000 barrels of oil per day.37  Certainly, Russia is interested in 
keeping the export of these natural resources safe during transit across the different 
borders.  It is estimated that Kazakhstan has between 9 and 17.6 billion barrels of oil 
reserves and an additional 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  The 1,500-kilometer 
pipeline being constructed and running from the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan to the 
Russian terminal in Novorossiysk further demonstrates Russian interest and investment in 
the region.38  
D. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
In an effort to reduce tension between the Central Asian countries and decrease 
the possibilities of border disputes erupting into serious conflict, it is crucial to have in 
place an international monitoring organization, one that includes all countries in the 
region and also Russia.  Such an organization already exists and it is recommended that 
the Shanghai Cooperation Group (SCO) be the focus of any attempt at assistance within 
the region with regards to border security and settlement of border disputes.  The SCO 
was founded in 1998, initially known as the Shanghai Five (1996), and has evolved into 
an organization whose members (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) have a common interest, both for security and now economics, in this region.   
Economic prosperity is impossible without regional stability; therefore, the SCO 
could concentrate initially on achieving border security by legal means rather than 
military, with economic success in the region being the motivating factor.  Russia 
currently has immense interest in the region for trade, especially natural gas and oil, 
proving that such an organization is essential for the future wealth of both Russia and the  
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Central Asian States.  With the support of such an organization ensuring greater regional 
stability through sanctions and other legal non-violent means, more productive economic 
trade logically would follow.   
The SCO is the entity in which Russia and Central Asia need to focus some of 
their energies in order to attain greater security in this region, with the likelihood of 
developing stronger economic ties.  Greater emphasis must be placed upon the 
importance of the SCO as it attempts to promote cooperation in Central Asia by settling 
border disputes through economic means, rather than allowing the status quo to continue, 
in which attempts to settle disputes are likely to turn violent.  This institution also gives 
Russia the opportunity to assist Central Asia, while tempering Chinese influence in the 
region, as China is a member of the SCO, and itself is very interested in Central Asia. 
With support of G8 members in highlighting the need for regional stability, the 
SCO could focus more on economics in the region, with security measures considered a 
means to an economic end.  From both Russia and China there is already immense 
interest for trade in the region (especially gas and oil), demonstrating yet another reason 
the assistance of such an organization is essential.  With the aid of such an organization 
and the ensuing greater regional stability, easier and more productive economic trade 
would naturally follow.  The evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Group, from a 
strictly border dispute organization to one more deeply involved in economic trade 
issues, is illustrated by the 2004 discussions among its members regarding an economic 
free trade zone.39  The SCO is also an entity that the international community (G8) needs 
to draw attention to in order to attain greater security in this region.  Stronger emphasis 
must be placed upon the importance the SCO as it attempts to promote cooperation in 
Central Asia by settling border disputes through economic means, rather than allowing 
the status quo to continue in which attempts to settle disputes are likely to turn violent.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Central Asia’s cooperation with the United States during Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom strongly suggests that these countries unite for a 
greater cause.  If there is something significant to be gained from such cooperation (i.e., 
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increased security and improved economic condition), Central Asia can operate 
successfully as an entity.  According to Amalendu Misra, “thanks to the growing 
acceptance of regionalism [in Central Asia], it is also possible that states encountering 
such threats may actually come together to act in concert on a particular issue or 
issues.”40  Russia needs to take the initiative and aggressively pursue a policy with 
Central Asia using the SCO to improve border security and the economic welfare of all 
countries involved. 
As exemplified by the agreement signed in 2001 by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
delimiting 96 percent of the approximately 2,100 kilometer border they share, the Central 
Asian states have made some attempts to control border disputes.  The remaining 4 
percent of the border area is a resource-rich area that each country wants to control.  The 
mostly Kazakh population of the village of Bagys, for example, located four miles north 
of Tashkent, Uzbekistan, receives a majority of its economic revenues from Uzbekistan, 
in the form of salaries for work on the nearby state-run farm.  This village has been a 
focal point for border disputes between these two countries, as it claimed its 
independence in 2002 from both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  Land leases between 
Central Asian states, some instituted from as far back as 1946, are still being used as a 
basis for territorial holdings.  
It is evident that Central Asia needs an “outsider” to assist with border disputes 
and to aid in the economic recovery of the region.  The Central Asian Economic Union 
(CAEU) established in 1994 was an attempt to improve both the economic and security 
situations without any outside assistance.  The CAEU was effective alone in neither 
security nor economic reform.41  The SCO, however, has had success in the past by 
introducing and implementing measures to reduce military forces in border areas (e.g., 
1997).  There are three reasons the SCO has been successful and will continue to work in 
the region: “shared norms, shared interest, and a progressive approach.”42  For border 
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security and economic recovery in the region, Russia needs to continue participation in 
and increase its focus on the SCO, a stance that clearly will benefit Russia as well. 
With no signs of these water-related tensions easing anytime soon, an entity must 
be instituted within the region in order to control the use of water and regulate its flow.  
Water usage is a potential flashpoint for border disputes, as it is in ever-increasing 
demand for agriculture and also as a source of energy.  Due to the size and importance of 
the Toktogul Reservoir in the region, and the fact that it is the major source of water 
supply, the Central Asian states should focus on cooperation in terms of its use, in 
particular.  One indication of the seriousness and immediacy of the situation is that 
Uzbekistan has actually conducted military exercises that resembled the capture of the 
Toktogul Reservoir.  With a much larger military and more assets at its disposal, 
Uzbekistan could conceivably execute such an operation with successful tactical results.  
Despite likely success, it would be short-lived, however, as regional instability would 
ensue.  Instability, of course, should be avoided at all costs.  
Regarding Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, each country should either modify 
existing or build new reservoirs in order to accommodate the increased water flow from 
Kyrgyzstan in the winter months, storing it for summer use.  Uzbekistan should focus its 
resources on the modification of the Arnasai Reservoir, with the aim of increasing water-
retention capabilities.  Kazakhstan should construct an additional reservoir at Kok-Saray 
to assist with the winter overflow there.  This modifying and/or building of dams should 
occur under the framework of a regional cooperative agency.   
One option could be a reformed Interstate Coordinating Water Commission 
(ICWC), existing as a regional cooperation of equals (i.e., true partners).  With the added 
assistance of foreign aid and initial monitoring from NGOs, to be done in conjunction 
with the Central Asian countries themselves, regional water cooperation and regional 
stability might more likely come to fruition. 
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III. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the effects of Islamic fundamentalism on security and 
stability in Central Asia, with a detailed examination of both the militant Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the nonviolent Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al 
Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation).  Different factors determine the ability of how these 
two groups operate effectively in the region of Central Asia:  current regime’s repressive 
policy towards Muslims, its attempts to eliminate all political opposition and the effects 
these policies have on the population43; the depressed economic situation, considered to 
be a significant cause of fundamentalism in the region44; and outside influences, such as 
international financial assistance and ideological teachings, leading to the rise of radical 
Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
This examination will include an assessment of a long-term threat to the Central 
Asian region presented by the above-mentioned two groups.  Whether or not the IMU is 
reconstituting itself is an issue that must be addressed in order to determine if it will pose 
a more significant threat to stability in Central Asia than Hizb ut-Tahrir.  According to 
some experts on Central Asia, the IMU’s decimation during Operation Enduring Freedom 
has left the organization with no hope ever of reconstituting itself.45  However, the March 
2004 bombings in both Tashkent and Bukhara, and the July 2004 Embassy bombings in 
Tashkent, may signal a revitalization of IMU and may also lead to an increase in its 
recruitment.  On the other hand, there is some speculation that these recent events may be 
a “trigger” for prospective recruits to gravitate towards Hizb ut-Tahrir (as opposed to 
IMU), because IMU’s violence and drug trafficking practices make it a less attractive 
alternative.46  
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Whether or not the United States and/or Russia currently plays a major role in 
providing solutions to countering these organizations in the region of Central Asia also 
will be discussed.  Russia considers Central Asia to be its “near-abroad” and, therefore, 
well within its legitimate sphere of influence.  In reality, however, Russia's influence 
there is limited and Russian foreign policy is just now starting to focus on this area.  The 
United States, as well, has long been interested in the region because of the energy 
resources located in the Caspian Sea Basin.  Since 1991, however, U.S. businesses were 
able to operate there, and, in fact, have been doing business successfully in most of the 
Central Asian countries.  The United States has maintained a military presence in Central 
Asia since establishing bases in the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Recently, however, President Karimov of Uzbekistan decided not to continue leasing 
Karshi-Kanabad (K2) to the United States and, in fact, expects units to be gone no later 
than February 2006.  This has happened after severe U.S. criticism with regard to 
Uzbekistan’s lack of progress with human rights and democracy following the events in 
Andijan.  With the United States being driven out of Uzbekistan, Tashkent seems to be 
drifting back towards Russian influence, as it does not receive from Russia the same 
criticism of its human rights record and progress (or lack of such) in democracy-building. 
B. CAUSES OF FUNDAMENTALISM (IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA) 
Scholarly debate focuses on three causes of fundamentalism in Central Asia:  
political and religious oppression, economic depression, and the post-Soviet ideological 
void filled with external influences.  Some of the most striking examples of political and 
religious repression have been the policies President Karimov of Uzbekistan’s who 
banned all opposition parties, and restricted all religious activities in his country.47  In his 
attempt to repress opposition parties, he has been accused of violating human rights.  
International organizations (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Red Cross) have 
documented cases of torture and execution of Karimov’s political opponents and Islamic 
believers.  It is argued that this repressive policy, by denying any legal alternative 
platforms to the current regime’s critics, may actually be aiding rather than hindering 
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radical fundamentalists in their recruitment of future members.48  The Independent 
Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU) reported in 2002 that an estimated 
6,400 people were in prison on political or religious grounds.  These numbers were 
broken down further into the following groups: Wahhabis (radical Sunni Islamic 
members) 1,200 - 1,700, Hizb ut-Tahrir – 4,200 - 4,300, and pious Muslims – 600 -700.49 
The economic situation (discussed at length in Chapter IV) may be another cause 
of radical Islamic activity.  Poverty and unemployment can lead to an increase in 
extremism and can generate recruits for terrorist organizations.50  The large economic 
gap has led to social unrest.  The economic situation of the individual states in Central 
Asia varies somewhat, but all Central Asian states have fairly high unemployment and 
rates of inflation.  One of the lowest rates of unemployment is in Kazakhstan, at 8.3 
percent of a 15 million population (2004), and the highest is in Uzbekistan, with 
approximately 25 percent in a population of 25.8 million (1998).  The official rate of 
inflation for Central Asia recorded for 2004 was between 7.5 percent and 13.9 percent, 
with some unofficial estimates by IMF reaching 18 percent.51  In the Ferghana Valley, 
for example, unemployment is approximately 35 percent, with the majority of those 
unemployed under the age of 25.52  Thus, Ferghana Valley, not surprisingly, is a central 
location for recruitment of radical Islamists and a hotbed for terrorist training activity. 
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Central Asia experienced an “identity 
crisis” of sorts.  This “identity crisis” was, in part, caused by the Soviets’ consistent 
attempts at subduing Central Asian nationalism for the tenure of their occupation.53  
Islamic missionaries flowed much more easily into the region after 1991, filling the 
ideological void, and were crucial in developing a presence of a national identity.54  But 
fundamentalists, also, were able to take advantage of this ideological void and people’s 
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desire for a national identity; their modus operandi is to twist the meaning of Islam, 
preaching often successfully to those with little knowledge of true Islamic ideology.55 
C. THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
There are several phases in the rise of radical Islamists in Central Asia, leading to 
the emergence of the IMU as a violent militant organization.  This paper will cover 
briefly the period from the 1980s to the present, depicting how radical Islamists evolved 
into militant groups, the IMU in particular.     
During the 1980s the presence of Islam in Central Asia started to increase due, in 
part, to the less repressive political climate in the Soviet Union, which was then 
undergoing perestroika.  During this Soviet “re-building,” elements of the underground 
Islam were allowed to re-surface in Central Asia.  This emergence happened in large part 
with the financial support and ideological assistance from outside influences (i.e., Arab 
countries, Pakistan, Turkey).56 
Throughout this period more and more mosques and madrassahs were 
constructed and operating openly and freely with no negative repercussions from the 
government.  This circumstance led to an increase in the recruitment of Islamic 
parishioners, who previously were forbidden to participate freely in religious activities; 
now these same parishioners had an opportunity to express their religious devotion 
openly.  This new group of devotees was exposed to a form of Islam that was becoming 
increasingly strict, teaching a more “traditional” Islam at the newly built mosques and 
madrassahs throughout the region.57   
The trend toward a stricter form of Islam was in part influenced by Wahhabism, 
introduced by Saudi Arabian Islamic teachings and preached by Imams (religious 
teachers) trained in this school of thought.  The Imams taught Islamic morals, but called 
neither for a Caliphate (unified Islamic region) nor Sharia (Islamic law devoted to 
Islamic traditions and morals), as they did in the subsequent stages of development.  
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(SBMCAK), the first Wahhabi in Central Asia was Ziyauddin Babakhanov, who trained 
in Saudi Arabia from 1947-1948, and preached his Salafi views from 1943-1957 
(Salafism is the belief inspired by the Prophet Mohammed’s first Islamic state and the 
return to this idealized timeframe when violence was necessary and legitimate). 58  After 
a slight reprieve during the Second World War, Muslims once again were isolated by 
closed borders from the rest of the world.  This isolation led to stagnation in the growth 
of political Islam with Muslim identity expressed only through customs and traditions.  
The Imams once again taught underground, risking arrest and lengthy stays in the Gulags 
if caught.  This policy is reminiscent of the Bolsheviks’ campaign against Islam in 1927; 
mosques and madrassahs were closed and religious leaders were persecuted.59  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia 
entered a new stage in its development.  Initially, the collapse of the Soviet Union created 
an opportunity for the Islamic organizations to become opposition parties within the 
Central Asian countries; in Uzbekistan, for example, they formed the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP) which, at the time, was considered too moderate by young 
revivalists.  Concurrently, a stricter form of Islam was being preached by the Imams 
(influenced by Wahhabism), which included the adoption of the Sharia and the possible 
creation of an Islamic Caliphate similar to that of the one founded by the prophet 
Muhammad in the seventh century (i.e., a region not bound by territorial lines).  The IRP 
recognized the old Soviet territorial boundaries and did not push for an Islamic 
Caliphate; observing the traditional boundaries caused splinter groups to form within the 
IRP.60    
Two of the groups that splintered off from the IRP were Adolat (Justice) and 
Islam Lashkarlari.  The latter of these two, Islam Lashkarlari, founded in the town of 
Otawalikhon, was composed of Wahhabis, and focused on religious issues led by Tohir 
Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev who eventually led Adolat and then IMU.  Yuldeshev 
himself, now the leader of IMU, was a mullah in the underground Islamic movement, has 
considerable organizational skills, and has been influenced by the Taliban and Wahhabis 
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in Saudi Arabia.  He spent a great deal of time in Peshawar, Pakistan, studying at 
madrassahs and also making many contacts with Islamic parties throughout the Middle 
East and Central Asia.    Adolat, the other splinter group, was composed of young men 
trained in various fighting techniques, who formed a militant group.  Adolat generally is 
acknowledged as the precursor to the IMU.  Led by Juma Namangani (Jumaboi 
Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev), this group consolidated its power in the highly volatile 
Ferghana Valley where they patrolled streets restoring law and order, purportedly 
accepting no bribes and acting with religious conviction in order to win the support of the 
local population.  This group called for an Islamic revolution and abided by Sharia in 
hopes of achieving an Islamic state.61 
The next phase in the evolution of the Islamic fundamentalism (1992-95) began 
soon after a meeting between Uzbek President Karimov and Islamic groups in the city of 
Namangan.  The agenda was to discuss the future of Islamic organizations in 
Uzbekistan’s government, and specifically the formation of Uzbekistan as an Islamic 
state.  The meeting was fruitless and, in fact, had negative repercussions for the Islamic 
organizations, when Karimov subsequently initiated a ban on IRP and Adolat and began 
an active crackdown on Islamic groups throughout Uzbekistan, especially in Ferghana 
Valley.  Karimov’s repression of opposition to his regime and the suppression of Islam 
caused many radical Islamists to flee Uzbekistan.  The majority of them, to include 
Namangani, fled to Tajikistan where they fought in the civil war on the side of the 
Islamic opposition.  The war lasted from 1992 to 1997, resulting in President 
Rakhmonov’s legalizing the IRP party in Tajikistan and allowing parliamentary seats for 
its members.62  Yuldeshev initially fled to Afghanistan with other leaders of the IRP, 
where he assisted in spreading propaganda for the Islamists and formed relationships with 
other Islamic organizations.63  
D. EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU) 
In 1996 the IMU emerged as a discrete organization with explicit goals:  the 
removal of President Karimov by force, and the establishment of Uzbekistan as an 
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Islamic state.64  The first act of violence allegedly committed by the IMU was the 
attempted assassination of President Karimov in Tashkent in February of 1999.  The 
group used five car bombs in a coordinated attack on several buildings within the 
government compound.  In the assassination attempt 16 civilians were killed and over 
100 were injured; damage was estimated at 5.5 million dollars.65  Of the 22 IMU 
members apprehended, six were executed and the rest are serving 10-20 year prison 
sentences.66   
In the summer of 1999, the IMU started a campaign of hostage taking in order to 
finance itself, and continue in the pursuit of its goals.  Among the hostages was a group 
of four Japanese geologists, for which the government of Japan paid an undisclosed 
ransom (assessed to be 6 million Yen).67  The 1999 Tashkent bombings and the hostage-
taking led the U.S. State Department in 2000 to list the IMU as a terrorist organization.68  
The IMU also started cross border incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, basing 
itself in Tajikistan.  During this time Namangani led successful well planned and 
executed raids, capturing villages in Kyrgyzstan and killing Uzbek soldiers on raids into 
Uzbekistan.  Also at this time the IMU used Tajikistan as a sanctuary and was able to 
access Ferghana valley easily, causing friction between the regimes of Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.69 
E. RECONSTITUTION OF IMU 
Prior to the 2004 bombings in Tashkent and Bukhara, the last violent act by the 
IMU in Tashkent was in 1999.  With such a lengthy hiatus between these acts of violence 
it was believed the IMU was severely affected by the assessed loses they suffered during 
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Operation Enduring Freedom and, in fact, was unable to conduct terrorist operations in 
the region.  After the bombings in 2004 there is little doubt, however, that IMU survivors 
have at the very least initiated activity and regrouped; it is possible the IMU has merged 
with other terrorist organizations and is again actively operating in Central Asia. 
The March and April 2004 bombings and firefights in Tashkent and Bukhara were 
coordinated suicide-bomber attacks, and the first violent terrorist attacks since the 1999 
assassination attempt on President Karimov.70  These attacks are highly significant in that 
they were the first cases of suicide bombers in Central Asia, not to mention that the 
bombers were female.  These attacks differed from the 1999 attack in that the terrorists 
targeted the Chorsu market in Tashkent using two female suicide-bombers with the 
obvious intent of inflicting casualties on civilians rather than the government, as they had 
in 1999.  In 1999 the coordinated attack was carried out within a group of government 
buildings and was in line with IMU’s explicit goal of removing President Karimov.  The 
attacks in March and April of 2004 may indicate IMU’s merging with other terrorist 
organizations such as Al Qaeda, which have used suicide-bombers in their tactics to 
cause fear among the population at large; the potential exists for these types of attacks to 
lead indirectly to regime reform (e.g., March 2004 Madrid bombings and the withdrawal 
of Spanish forces from Iraq).71  In addition, the use of female suicide-bombers is similar 
to attacks by Chechen terrorists in Moscow in 2004 and may suggest a link with other 
terrorist organizations. 
In July 2004, terrorists attacked three locations in Tashkent:  the U.S. Embassy, 
the Israeli Embassy, and the Uzbek State Prosecutor’s Office.72  Once again, suicide-
bombers were used, similar to the attacks in March and April.  This time, however, two 
of the targets were foreign embassies, possibly indicating a new approach to the IMU’s 
original goal of removing President Karimov; or perhaps it indicates an addition of a new 
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ideology to the IMU’s goals, which focus on anti-western and anti-Semitic ideologies.73  
The targeting of U.S. and Israeli Embassies was significant in that it was the first time a 
foreign entity in Central Asia was targeted by terrorists.  The suicide-bomber who 
targeted the Prosecutor’s office, however, was in line with the original IMU tactics of 
targeting government officials.  This specific act of terror was most likely a direct 
response to the trial four days earlier of 15 suspects being charged for the terrorist acts of 
March and April of 2004.74 
In addition to the 2004 terrorist bombings, the IMU may be taking sanctuary in 
Pakistan and even perhaps in Tajikistan, where they previously maintained bases.75  
Operating in these locations may have been a significant factor in this reconstitution, 
giving them the necessary time to regroup, and possibly form unions with other groups.  
These sanctuaries would also provide them with the required time to gather finances 
needed to reconstitute their organization and conduct operations on a continual basis. 
Central Asian countries have been concerned about the re-emergence of IMU and 
have been vigilantly observing their activities since Operation Enduring Freedom.  In 
July 2003, the Chairman of the Kazakhstani National Security Service (KNB), Nartai 
Butbayev, confirmed increased activity of the IMU in Kazakhstan.76  The Deputy Interior 
Minister acknowledged in March 2005 that IMU members were spreading into the 
Western region of Kazakhstan.77  A weapons cache was found in Batken, Kyrgyzstan, in 
June 2003 and the Kyrgyz National Security Services suspects IMU is involved with the 
weapons.  They also believe that the IMU is possibly connected to the December 2002 
and May 2003 bombings in Kyrgyzstan, which killed 8 and injured 40.  At the time, this 
was attributed to the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT), which is thought to be either 
another group, or consists of IMU members who have merged with other terrorist 
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organizations.78  The Kyrgyz authorities assert that the IMU, Uighur separatists, and 
other terrorist groups have linked up to form the IMT and are operating together 
throughout Central Asia.79   
During the same period, in June 2003 the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) 
reported tracking 600 IMU members traveling to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and 
Chechnya.80  The observation of IMU members’ traveling to Pakistan may be of the 
greatest concern, since it can potentially confirm a relationship between IMU and Al 
Qaeda, both of which provided support to the Taliban during OEF and fled due to U.S. 
interdiction.81  In 2005 President Karimov of Uzbekistan and President Pervez Musharref 
of Pakistan agreed on an extradition treaty for Tohir Yuldeshev (leader of IMU), who is 
presumed to be operating in the Waziristan region of Pakistan.  This visit highlights the 
significance to which both countries place on the continued threat of IMU.82  
According to Rashid and Naumkin, the effects of OEF probably were too difficult 
for the IMU to overcome and significantly hinder any real chance of a reconstitution of 
this organization.  However, in light of this research reconstitution is plausible and 
probable, as demonstrated by the recent attacks in Tashkent and likely involvement in 
other Central Asian countries, as discussed earlier in this section.  According to Roger 
McDermott, there is evidence of a possible overlap of militant groups in Central Asia and 
evidence that they are working together in these recent attacks.83  Research indicates the 
IMU is part of a network and receives support from other fundamentalist Islamist groups 
throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and China.  In addition, the harboring by other 
countries of IMU militants, providing them with training camps, and assisting with 
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finances leads to the determination that the group is still active; additionally, the recent 
terrorist events in Uzbekistan indicate it again is a fully operational organization.  
F. BACKGROUND OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR AL ISLAMI (THE PARTY OF 
ISLAMIC LIBERATION) 
IMU has many goals in common with Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, an underground 
fundamentalist Islamist group calling for the overthrow of the governments in Central 
Asia.  Unlike the explicitly violent IMU, however, Hizb ut-Tahrir professes to follow a 
non-violent means of transforming the governments is Central Asia and is not considered 
a “terrorist organization” by the U.S. State Department.  In order to compare Hizb ut-
Tahrir and the IMU, it is necessary to review briefly the history of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and 
to present possible reasons that both the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir were able to emerge in 
Central Asia. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by Taqieddin an-
Nabhani, with the goal of replacing current Muslim governments with an ideal Muslim 
State (Caliphate) similar to that which existed in seventh century Arabia.  The Caliphate 
is a region or place in which the Prophet Muhammad envisioned all Muslims living, with 
Sharia as its basic tenet and with all abiding by this Islamic law.  According to Hizb ut-
Tahrir, the creation of this Caliphate is to happen in three stages of political struggle: 
individual shaping of the mind, shaping of the collective mind (spreading views by 
Mosques and leaflets), and replacing current governments and implementing Islam 
completely throughout world. 
The first two stages are to assist in developing an understanding of the organization’s 
ideology leading to the third and final stage of the Caliphate.84  In the 1950s Hizb ut-
Tahrir started its operation in the Levant region and it quickly spread in the 1960s 
throughout the rest of the Muslim world (i.e., Jordan, Syria, N. Africa and Turkey).85  
With little change over the years, the organization uses An-Nabhanis’ writings 
(from the 1950s and 60s) as the basis for its ideology.  His approach for radical change of 
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governments differed from other Islamist theory in that there was no gradual integration 
for the Muslim societies.  He stated in his writings that Muslims must first concentrate on 
the formation of the Caliphate and that is the paramount goal as noted by the following: 
“For a land to be considered an Islamic state, every single article of the country’s 
constitution, every rule and law, must emanate from the Islamic Sharia.”  This statement 
exemplifies his non-compromising position with any existing state.  An-Nabhani also 
accepted modernity, embracing technology and organizational patterns of modern 
revolutionary movements (i.e., Leninism) such as the idea of a vanguard party.86 
G. HIZB UT-TAHRIR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
There is one central leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir:  Ata Abu-l-Rishtah.  He is the 
current and third Amir of the organization, following Yusuf Sheikh Abdul Qadeem 
Zaloom, a founding member who replaced An-Nabhani.  Abu-l-Rishtah is a scholar and 
has been involved with the organization since 1955, and it is apparent that he has the 
same ideology as the founding members.  Abu-l-Rishtah dictates the strategy for Hizb ut-
Tahrir and this strategy is passed through a network of cells throughout the organization 
with all members subscribing fully to the decisions of the central leader.87   
This hierarchal system, using the different clandestine cell networks for secrecy, 
has been compared to the Bolsheviks’ pre-revolutionary activities, and in the same way is 
difficult for state authorities to target.88  A new member-candidate must meet certain 
requirements prior to becoming a full member in Hizb ut-Tahrir, in order to ensure total 
loyalty, again similar to the manner in which the Bolsheviks operated.  The potential 
member must become intimate with all party literature during the initial two-year 
indoctrination phase. This phase is supervised by a mushrif (senior party member) who 
eventually determines at what point the candidate has attained the correct maturity and 
has fully adopted the Hizb ut-Tahrir culture; only then is the candidate admitted as a full 
member to the party Hizb ut-Tahrir.89  
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As described by Jalaluddin Patel, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s administration leader in 
Britain, the organization has two levels of operations in England.  It works with the 
Muslim community in defining the workings of the Caliphate, how Muslims are 
supposed to live in the West, and how they are to maintain their Islamic identities.  The 
second goal is to expose people in the general population to the cause of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and the need for a Caliphate to serve as the only political means for Islam to survive in 
today’s world.90  
According to the U.S. State Department, Hizb ut-Tahrir cells are organized into 
five-member units (halka); these cells form their own groups. The leader of each group is 
the only member in the group able to contact the next higher cell in the echelon.  
Members are usually recruited through friends and family and this method of recruitment 
has greatly assisted with increasing the numbers in the organization, especially in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.91  There are several assessments regarding the actual 
number of members belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia, suggesting a number of 
more than 15,000-20,000.92  Uzbeks constitute the majority of the Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members in Central Asia, and in fact, a significant number of suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members are imprisoned in Uzbekistan (approximately 7,000) for suspicious religious or 
political activity.93  Recruitment of members outside of Uzbekistan has increased, 
especially in Kyrgyzstan (1000-1200) and Tajikistan (1000-2000), most likely due to 
those governments’ policies towards religious practices.94  In Tajikistan the authorities 
arrested at least 22 suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir members during February and March 2004, 
with some of these suspects carrying “anti-constitutional literature,” indicating increased 
activity.95   
It has also been argued that people in Central Asia are easily recruited by Hizb ut-
Tahrir not because of their political agenda of addressing grievances, but by the idea of 
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open-borders between Central Asian states, allowing for easier trade and travel.96 On 
September 1, 2004, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev, warned in a press conference that 
terrorist activity was increasing in Central Asia and that Hizb ut-Tahrir had been 
operating more freely.  He stated that Kazakh authorities had seized 11,000 Hizb ut-
Tahrir leaflets so far that year, as opposed to the 1,000 they had seized in 2003.97  This 
discovery led President Nazarbaev to request the passing of a special law to counteract 
extremism.  Such a law is especially indicative of the threat of Hizb ut-Tahrir because 
until now Kazakhstan had the most liberal attitude toward Hizb ut-Tahrir in all of Central 
Asia.98   
H. HIZB UT-TAHRIR’S MOVE TOWARDS MILITANT RHETORIC 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s rhetoric has become more and more militant since the start of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  According to the U.S. State Department, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
leaflets have condemned U.S. forces in Central Asia and have condoned suicide-bomber 
attacks against Israel.  Leaflets found soon after the start of OEF also claimed the United 
States and United Kingdom were waging war against Islam and that Muslims needed to 
rise up to the West and defend themselves.  In a response to a question posed regarding 
the 9/11 attacks in America and the justification for these attacks, Jalaluddin Patel 
expressed Hizb ut-Tahrir’s desire to confront the West: “We immediately declared that 
this is not the proper or even effective method of fighting Western imperialism. We do 
see Western imperialism as the key factor in the continuing decline of the Islamic world 
and we do impress upon Muslims that they have to confront this imperialism.”99  His 
statement is vague at best, leaving room for its interpretation as anti-western, perhaps 
even violently anti-western. 
The latest “leaflet” published on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official website is unambiguous 
in revealing its attitude towards the West; in fact, it confirms any suspicions regarding its 
stance in obtaining its final goal of a Muslim Caliphate by destroying the West:  
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O Muslims!  You are now aware of the poison that they mixed with fat in 
the American project for the Middle East. Rather, it is poison alone 
without any fat mixed in; so what are you waiting for? What are your 
armies waiting for? What are the influential people amongst you waiting 
for? Are you waiting till America has implemented its project for the 
Middle East, the great one and the small one, and thus your countries 
become full of prisons more than just Abu Ghuraib? Do you wait till your 
children face the same end, which that little girl faced when she raised her 
trembling hands while the gun was pointed towards her? Do you wait for 
any good from your rulers? They are actually the misfortune and the 
source of the disease; and they are the people who placed the countries in 
the grip of the enemies. O Muslims! Hizb ut-Tahrir calls upon you to 
mobilize your forces and rally your ranks to help and support it in its work 
to establish the Khalifah state, by which you will restore your glory, attain 
the good pleasure of your lord and destroy your enemy.100 
To date there has been no confirmed evidence of Hizb ut-Tahrir participating in 
any violent acts in Central Asia; however, in June 2003, Russia arrested over 100 
suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Moscow and two of the arrested members 
eventually were charged with possession of plastic explosives, grenades, and detonators.  
The two men charged also were carrying Hizb ut-Tahrir literature, establishing a possible 
link with the organization.101  The existence of Hizb ut-Tahrir members with explosives 
can be seen as possible preparations of violent acts, or these particular Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members may have become disaffected and impatient with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s current 
peaceful policy.  However, a similar progression from peaceful to violent methods has 
occurred in Central Asia in the past, as demonstrated by IRP members splintering off into 
Adolat, with these members subsequently becoming impatient with the pace of progress, 
subsequently establishing IMU as the next alternative.   
The similarities between the Bolsheviks, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and their respective goals 
of revolution, suggest a course of action leading towards the professed necessity of 
violent action in order to take-over Muslim countries and achieve the final goal of the 
Caliphate.102  According to Hizb ut-Tahrir propaganda posted on their official homepage, 
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dated June 2001, all forms of struggle against the enemy are authorized, to include 
murder. In this same article Hizb ut-Tahrir demands that all Muslims assist the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in its fight against the United States.103  In the interview with Jalaluddin 
Patel, he states that it will take only one Muslim state to fall and the rest will follow and 
then a political Islam will rule for all Muslims.  In order for this to be achieved, and 
within the guidelines of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a takeover of a country will have to occur and it 
will most likely be a violent act.  The secret cells operating throughout Central Asia will 
eventually reach a point where their numbers will allow an attempt at an overthrow 
similar to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.104   
Past activity of Hizb ut-Tahrir proves that members participated in attempted 
coups in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In 1968, members attempted to seize power in 
Jordan against King Hussein II.105  Hizb ut-Tahrir refuted allegations that it was directly 
involved and suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir individuals were operating on their own 
initiative without Hizb ut-Tahrir support.  The fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir has a very 
centralized cell system and hierarchal means of management coordinating and mandating 
all that happens within the group, however, belies that Hizb ut-Tahrir itself was not 
involved.  Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir may eventually act violently in an effort to 
overthrow a given country’s regime.106      
I. UNITED STATES’ PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA  
Obviously, the existence and viability of terrorist organizations (IMU and Hizb 
ut-Tahrir) in Central Asia is of great concern to policy makers of both the United States 
and Russia.  Currently, the United States is pursuing three strategic interests in Central 
Asia:   
1.  Security:  assisting with anti-terrorism, proliferation, and narco-
trafficking. 
2.  Energy:  the safe transit of oil and gas directly affects energy 
revenues and contributes to the economic growth in Central Asia.  
                                                 
103 Ariel Cohen. 
104 Ibid. 
105 International Crisis Group.  ICG Asia Report, No. 58, p. 3. 
106 Ariel Cohen. 
37 
3.  Internal Reform:  by promoting democracy the United States 
hopefully can improve human rights, freedoms, and increase tolerance. 107    
 
Regarding security in Central Asia, the U.S. currently has approximately 4,000 
personnel based in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, supporting its Global War on 
Terrorism, focused at the moment in Afghanistan.108  According to Roger McDermott, 
the U.S. needs to remain in the region of Central Asia to support efforts against terrorism 
and to assist fledgling governments in their development as young independent states.109  
This sentiment is echoed by several other scholars of Central Asia, as well as the 
Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives, which states 
the U.S. should stay in the region providing stability and should assist with the 
implementation of democratic institutions therein.110   
It is fair to say that the United States, now that it has its foot in the proverbial door 
of Central Asia, will try to remain there for as long as possible.  In fact, the U.S. has been 
interested in this region at least since 1992 when President H.W. Bush introduced the 
Freedom Support Act, aimed at assisting the newly independent states with humanitarian 
aid, economic assistance, and guidance with democratization.  This aid policy continued 
with the 1999 passage of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which increased this aid and 
support.111  The U.S. has continued this support and in fact has bolstered its relationship 
with these countries as demonstrated by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  During OEF the Central Asian countries offered over-
flight rights to the United States, and U.S. forces set up military bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, which remain today.  During OIF, Kazakhstan joined the coalition against 
Iraq demonstrating the way in which the United States is developing relationships with 
these countries.     
                                                 
107 U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations. Central Asia: Terrorism, 
Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. United States: Congress House (2003). 
108 Shahram Akbarzadeh, p.689. 
109 Roger N. McDermott, p.v. 
110 U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, Central Asia: Terrorism, 
Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. United States: Congress House (2003): 3. 
111 Jim Nichol. “Central Asia:  Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, Order Code IB93108, (17 August 2005): 1-16. 
38 
Research indicates U.S. presence in the region is aiding with short-term stability 
by reducing Islamic insurgency and decreasing the numbers of potential safe houses and 
training camps used in Afghanistan by militants.  However, for long-term stability, 
cooperation between all the Central Asian states is needed in order to develop anti-
terrorist capabilities in conjunction with U.S. support.112   During Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), Namangani of IMU assisted the Taliban in its fight against the U.S. and 
led several missions against them in Mazar-I-Sharif.  Although exact numbers are 
difficult to determine, it is assessed that from 300-600 IMU members were killed during 
OEF; Namangani himself may also have been killed in a U.S. air attack in 2002.113   
Consequently, the IMU’s capability to conduct terrorist attacks was severely 
degraded after OEF, and left many wondering if the IMU could reconstitute and pose a 
threat in the future. 
There is a debate among experts regarding the stabilizing influence of the local 
presence of the United States.  One school of thought suggests the United States’ 
presence in Central Asia is having a positive effect in terms of stability and the reduction 
of terrorism in the region.114  An opposing view holds that U.S. forces in Central Asia do 
not now and will not ever contribute to long-term stability, as regional stability needs to 
come first from within the states themselves; only then, it is believed, should outside aide 
be accepted.115 
J. RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The presence of radical Islamic fundamentalists is perhaps the most significant to 
Russia with regard to Central Asia, as it perceives this possible terrorist breeding ground 
as a danger to Russia (e.g., a training ground for terrorists fighting in Chechnya). Groups 
like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claiming ties with Al Qaeda, and having 
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experience of fighting in Afghanistan, pose a threat not only in Central Asia, but to 
Russia as well.116  There is a significant concern that the Islamic fundamentalists in the 
region will spillover into Russia.  It is not implausible that these groups could assist with 
training for terrorists entering Russia as well as conduct activities within Russian borders.  
Terrorists may use Central Asia, and Uzbekistan specifically, as a training ground where 
they can prepare for operations in Chechnya and other parts of Russia.  
Russia has an interest in maintaining the Central Asian region as a buffer-zone to 
keep Islamic fundamentalists out of Russia, and has concerns for ethnic Russian 
population still living in the region.  Russia maintains a military presence in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan demonstrating its determination to maintain security presence in the 
region.  There are 7,800 Russian troops in Tajikistan serving in the 201st motorized rifle 
division, and approximately 300 - 700 in Kyrgyzstan stationed at Kant Airfield, with the 
support of approximately two-dozen aircraft.117  
Russia understands that there is no longer military parity with the United States 
and Russian strategic concerns need to be modified to adapt to the new security 
challenges.  There is now a necessity to cooperate in partnerships with the United States 
and West European States to resolve new security conflicts in the region. 
New global realities have been addressed by Russia and were discussed in the 
2003 Ministry of Defense (MOD) document Priority Tasks of the Russian Armed Forces. 
Russian leadership has been reforming the military over the past decade to meet new 
challenges due to the current political relationship with the West.  Russia has also 
realized it will not be fighting the United States and is trimming down the military in an 
effort to focus on new challenges such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and internal 
conflicts.118 
The MOD report addresses five major ways in which Russia fits into the world’s 
military and political system, and helps also to shed some light on how Russia perceives 
itself on the global stage: 
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1. The new challenges of globalization with regard to 
proliferation of WMD, terrorism, ethnic conflict, religious 
fundamentalism, illegal drugs, and organized crime.  To gain any success 
underlying Russia’s commitment to cooperation, these challenges have to 
be met with a cooperative, rather than a unilateral effort.   
2. The use of temporary coalitions for quelling conflict is a 
necessity due to current world dynamics (e.g., terrorism).  Russia states it 
will join coalitions if it is in its national interest to do so.   
3. Economic concerns are becoming more and more important 
and are dictating foreign policy.  Russian military forces will be used to 
assist with the protection of economic assets; this use demonstrates 
Russia’s willingness to change.   
4. Terrorism is an additional area of focus for Russia and the 
merging of both domestic and international terrorism poses a great threat.  
Russia is assisting on a global scale with this dilemma, and has stated it 
will be a major player in the fight against it.   
5. Russia has been more accepting of non-state actors in its 
foreign policy development and understands there is room for these 
agencies with regard to building a greater Russia.119 
One last point to address regarding Russia’s role in the world is the fact that 
Russia believes that the United Nations Security Council is the central means for creating 
and maintaining stability throughout the world.  This fact, along with Russia’s belonging 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CST), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), proves it is 
committed to its new status as a team player  
Along with the new role Russia is playing in international politics, there is also 
the necessity to understand what new threats are facing this country.  In President Putin’s 
opening remarks in the MOD report, he states that Russia is in fact faced by numerous 
new threats and that reform of the military needs to match these threats.  He states that 
these areas of concern are:  collective security, terrorism, peacekeeping, and threats in 
regional areas.120 
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The Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, classifies the threats into three general 
categories:  internal, external, and trans-border.  The following list is what the MOD 




1. The use of force in an attempt to change the constitutional 
regime and violate the territorial integrity of Russia. 
2. The creation, equipment, training and operation of illegal 
armed formations. 
3. Illegal circulation (trafficking) in the territory of Russia of 
weapons, munitions, explosives, and so on. 
4. Large-scale operation of organized crimes that threatens the 
political stability on the scale of a constituent member of the Russian 
Federation. 
5. The operation of separatist and radical religious-nationalist 




1. The operation of structures connected with the international 
terrorist community in the territory of Russia. 
2. The training in the territory of other states of armed groups 
for operation in the territory of Russia or its allies. 
3. Trans-border crime, including smuggling and other illegal 
actions, which calls for the use of border guards.121 
 
Ivanov continues throughout his remarks to emphasize terrorism and how 
international terrorism has merged with internal terrorism, creating an even more 
dangerous threat to Russia.  One of the more serious threats to Russia comes from the 
southern region of Central Asia; there is a legitimate concern regarding the large 
population of Islamic communities in the south and the potential threat of a 
fundamentalist group controlling these areas.122 
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K. CONCLUSION 
Research indicates that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is reconstituting, and 
as demonstrated by the recent terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, poses a serious threat not 
only within Central Asia but outside the region as well (e.g., fighting in Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan).  IMU is still the most active violent terrorist organization in the region, 
even after fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan nearly decimated its ranks.  The 
U.S. and Russian militaries, businesses, and Russian Diasporas in Central Asia cannot 
overlook the importance of this organization and its penchant for violence.  The IMU 
poses the greatest short to medium-term threat in the region.  Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, 
presents a medium to long-term threat, and contrary to its nonviolent rhetoric, is a far 
greater danger in Central Asia than IMU, as it continues to fill the ideological vacuum 
there by proselytizing a skewed Islam in the hopes of achieving the Caliphate.  It is 
plausible and logical to state that Central Asia could be used as the geographic base for 
Hizb ut-Tahrir to initiate its final goal of overthrowing governments, and begin its 
campaign towards a unified Caliphate.   
Governments trying to co-opt Hizb ut-Tahrir will find it impossible, as such an 
effort directly contradicts Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stated philosophy of not recognizing existing 
governments; Hizb ut-Tahrir will never join any regime in any capacity.123  Therefore, in 
order to stem the influence throughout the rest of the region of Hizb ut-Tahrir and its 
purported agenda, this organization must be prevented from reaching its potential in the 
Central Asian states. 
The Central Asian states should continue to foster relationships with both the 
United States and Russia, as these two countries are supporting the region with economic 
assistance, military training, and counter-terrorism expertise, all of which help lead to 
overall stabilization.  The United States’ desire to remain in the region of Central Asia 
should be looked upon not as a threat to Russia, but as an opportunity for Russia to take 
advantage of the United States’ financial support, and to learn effective anti-terrorist 
strategies.  In addition to this support, the United States already has managed to promote 
cooperation within the region (e.g., training the Uzbek military, building-up bases in 
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Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), from which Russia can now profit.  The United States and 
Russia continue to have concerns about the potential for spillover from Islamic 
fundamentalist groups within Central Asia, and for the near future are intent on remaining 
in the region (i.e., to assist with stemming this potential terrorism spillover).  The Central 
Asian countries, as discussed, need to accept U.S. and Russian assistance in order to 
contain these groups and manage stabilization efforts within the region.  Only when these 
two active Islamic fundamentalist groups, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-
Tahrir, no longer pose a serious threat to the region should Central Asia reduce its 
reliance upon the United States and Russia.  In this way, the region of Central Asia has an 
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IV. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this chapter is to present the current extent to which both the United 
States and Russia are involved within the Central Asian region through trade, economic 
aid, and investments, especially in energy resources.  One consideration to be addressed 
is whether or not either the United States or Russia currently plays a major role in 
providing solutions to the economic crises in Central Asia, and whether or not such 
solutions will lead to overall stability in the region.  At present, oil is one of the foremost 
topics of concern in world politics and economy.124  As the demand for oil increases 
throughout the world, its value becomes more and more important not only for a 
country’s economy, but for its security.  Due to this demand for oil and concerns of 
national security, dependence solely on oil in the Middle East will limit a given country’s 
independence and security; therefore, some countries have been seeking to obtain oil 
from outside the region of the Arabian Gulf, as a means of reducing dependence on one 
region.125  Consequently, the energy resources of Central Asia will be in high demand for 
the foreseeable future.   
Russia considers Central Asia to be its “near-abroad” and, therefore, well within 
its legitimate sphere of influence.  Russia’s foreign policy is just now starting to focus on 
this area after having dealt with its own domestic concerns.  The United States, as well, 
has been interested in the energy resources under the Caspian Sea since the collapse of 
the USSR.  After 1991 U.S. businesses have been doing business in the majority of the 
Central Asian countries.  
Natural resources are found in abundance in Central Asia.  For instance, 
Kazakhstan possesses the largest oil reserves in the region and, according to the 
Department of Energy (DOE), has between 9 and 17.6 billion barrels of oil, as well as 
having 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  Turkmenistan has 101 trillion cubic feet of 
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natural gas, according to the DOE, and has one of the largest gas fields in the world.126  
Uzbekistan is the region’s largest producer and exporter of cotton, and gold production 
there is one of the highest in the world.  Kyrgyzstan produces gold, wool, and several 
minerals that it exports around the world.  Tajikistan mines a large amount of aluminum 
and is second only to Uzbekistan with cotton exports in the region.  
Central Asia offers economic opportunities for both the United States and Russia 
not only because of the region’s vast supply of natural resources, but also because of its 
role as a transportation corridor (i.e., the Silk Road):  North to South (from the Baltic 
region to Iran, Pakistan, and India), and East to West (from China to Europe).  Central 
Asian states are currently unable to build their infrastructure without investment from the 
United States, Russia, China, Germany, and other countries.  In addition, because Central 
Asia is landlocked, it is dependent upon other countries for the transportation of its 
resources.  Due to the immediate need for improvements in infrastructure and for foreign 
investment, Central Asia must rely on the United States and Russia for assistance.  
B. BACKGROUND AND BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was left not only with a 
weakened economy on the verge of collapse, but also with Soviet-era leaders ruling these 
newly independent states.  These leaders were more concerned with personal power and 
wealth than with creating a successful economic plan for growth and development; 
corruption, cronyism, and nepotism were common practice.  These leaders are the same 
people with whom both the United States and Russian governments (and businesses) 
must cooperate in order to maintain presence and influence in this region.  By the same 
token, Central Asian states must find a balance between both the U.S. and Russia, 
regarding their respective influences, in order to benefit from financial assistance and 
further investments.   
Economies of the Central Asian states suffered due the sudden collapse of the 
USSR, which left the new governments in disarray during the initial years of 
independence.  Fifteen years later, with regional cooperation absent for the most part, this 
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disorder remains.  One of the regional problems is the post-Soviet border demarcation, 
which has resulted in border disputes.  Such disputes have had a negative economic 
impact upon the Central Asian states, with several barriers to trade already existing 
throughout the region.  For example, the high price of visas and the increased difficulty in 
obtaining them has had a serious effect on cross-border trade, with significant slowing 
down or ceasing altogether of trade in some areas.127  This situation is compounded by 
the fact that customs officers and border guards often are corrupt, harassing businessmen 
and traders who cross the border, making it prohibitively expensive to do so, as well as 
difficult for profitable trade. 
The Soviet government drew the borders in Central Asia which cut across ethnic 
lines; it did so purposefully to create an area that would be less likely to harbor future 
separatist movements.  Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states 
have had to clarify and define their borders while dealing with such factors as historical 
territorial claims, ethnic tension, the unilateral redrawing of borders by the Soviet Union, 
and domestic political demands.  The view of the World Bank is that those trade barriers 
are slowly eroding, but the potential for increased trade is far from being met, while it 
should be a priority for economic growth.   
In addition to the United States and Russia’s ever-increasing presence in Central 
Asia, this region also faces other powerful nations trying to make their own inroads.  For 
instance, China’s largest state-owned oil company, China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), recently purchased the Canadian owned oil company 
PetroKazakhstan for 4.2 billion U.S.dollars, indicative of China’s strong desire to 
increase its presence in the region.128  After being a net oil exporter just 10 years ago 
China is now, in fact, the second largest importer of oil after the United States.  The 
purchase of PetroKazakhstan, along with an annual increase of 30 percent in energy 
demand, clearly conveys China’s persistent interest in the region.129  India, a country that 
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currently uses 1.4 million barrels of oil per day, has been increasing its presence in the 
region and trying to direct the energy resources towards the South.  By 2020, it is 
estimated that India will triple its consumption of oil to 4.2 million barrels per day.  India 
continues to work with Turkmenistan on building a Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP) 
capable of delivering this oil.130  
C. UNITED STATES ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
After the collapse of Soviet Union and the formation of the new independent 
states in Central Asia in 1991, the United States opted for an initial policy of minimum 
involvement in the region and focused mainly on assisting Russian recovery.  This policy 
was recommended by Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State to President Clinton, 
and was intended to minimize any perception of provocation against Moscow, as well as 
to create an environment conducive to eventual stability in the region.  The Freedom 
Support Act (FSA), adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1992 to assist the former Soviet 
states, allotted only 4.8 percent of its account for security development in the Central 
Asian region to avoid provoking the Russians.  The United States’ interest in Central 
Asia increased in 1994, however, due to the discovery of potential energy resources 
estimated at 200 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in the region.131  The United States 
engaged in a few military-to-military exchange programs to continue its attempt at 
building a relationship with the Central Asian states, albeit at a slow pace and in an 
unobtrusive manner to ensure good relations with Russia in order to maintain regional 
stability.   
In 1998, Congress adopted the Silk Road Strategic Act, according to which the 
United States was to aid the new independent states in Central Asia (i.e., in developing 
their economies and democratic institutions, etc.), and at the same time prevent Russia 
and Iran from monopolizing the region’s oil and gas production.  The latter goal of 
preventing Russia and Iran from monopolizing the region’s oil was to be achieved by 
building a number of pipelines.132  In fact, the 1,700-kilometer Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
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Pipeline (Figure 3), costing 3.6 billion dollars, was the first pipeline to be constructed by 




Figure 3.   Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. 133  
   
The United States did not focus its economic assistance on Central Asia prior to 
September 11, 2001; until then the lion’s share of economic aid to the post-Soviet states 
had gone to Russia.  Between 1992 and 2004 the former Soviet states received $26 billion 
in aid.  Of the $26 billion total aid given between 1992 and 2004, approximately 24.8 
percent went to socio-economic development and 38.8 percent to security.  In 2004, the 
assistance given to the former Soviet Union was just below $2 billion with 17.1 percent 
going to socio-economic development and 63.3 percent to security.134  These figures 
indicate a sharp increase in aid allotted to security issues at the expense of socio-
economic development. 
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The amount of aid has decreased steadily since the surge of assistance 
immediately following the attacks on the U.S. in 2001; in fact, the FSA gave $584.5 
million in 2004, $555.5 million in 2005, and $482 million (a 13 percent decrease), has 
been approved for 2006.  The decrease in aid per individual country for the year’s 
2004/2005/2006 in Central Asia is as follows in Table 1 (in millions of dollars):   
 
 2004 2005 2006 
Kazakhstan $33.3 $26.7 $26 
Kyrgyzstan $36.2 $31 $30 
Tajikistan $24.5 $27 $25 
Turkmenistan $5.7 $6.5 $5.5 
Uzbekistan $35.9 $33.5 $30 
Table 1. Financial Aid to Central Asia (per Millions of U.S. Dollars).135 
 
The FSA allocations often are given to countries with certain caveats, including 
human rights violations, corruption of the political and judicial systems, etc.  President 
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan was found to have violated human rights in 2004, thus 
losing $8.5 million in FSA funds.  Again this year, his administration was accused of 
human rights violations in the Andijan region, costing the country $18 million in 
expected assistance.136  On the other hand, if a country is trying to develop along the path 
of democracy, the FSA will give additional funds to assist with the necessary financial 
backing.  In 2004 Kyrgyzstan received $12 million additional aid to assist with the 
building of democracy that came to fruition in 2005 with the Tulip Revolution.137  In 
2005, the United States Congress, eager to increase stability throughout the region, 
increased the amount of supplemental funds going to the new independent governments 
in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan.138     
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U.S. policy after September 11, 2001, has been to assist the Central Asian 
countries not only in combating terrorism by training forces (assisting with non-
proliferation in arms and trafficking), but to assist these states in developing free market 
economies.  These new free market economies will benefit the United States’ national 
interests by allowing free trade of both goods and services.  The U.S. wants to integrate 
the Central Asian states into the international community for economic growth, increased 
security, regional stability, and the stemming of Islamic fundamentalism.139  Presently, 
the United States is pursuing three strategic interests in Central Asia: 
1. Security:  assisting with anti-terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and 
narco-trafficking. 
2. Energy:  the safe transit of oil and gas directly affects energy 
revenues and contributes to the economic growth in Central Asia.  
3. Political Reform:  by promoting democracy, the United States 
hopes to improve human rights, strengthen political liberties, and increase 
tolerance.140 
  
The United States agenda regarding economics and financial assistance in Central 
Asia appears to be based on the regions energy resources.  It is plausible to assert that 
since the United States demand for oil is currently 2.3 million barrels per day, an increase 
of 190,000 barrels per day from December 2004 (and with an outlook for even more 
demand for oil) that the United States is interested in the region simply for its oil.141  
Another argument contends that the United States has bases and troops in the region only 
to secure the oil resources and to apply pressure to the governments in its effort to gain 
full access to these resources. Prior to September 11, 2001, however, the United States 
had neither military personnel stationed in Central Asia, nor any operational bases in the 
region.  There was also minimal military-to-military contact.  After September 11, 2001, 
the United States has developed its relations with all the Central Asian countries in order 
to establish basing rights and obtain overflight permissions in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  These relations have come to involve more than 
                                                 
139 Jim Nichol (17 August, 2005), p. i-13. 
140 U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on International Relations. Central Asia: Terrorism, 
Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. United States: Congress House, 2003. 
141 Sam Fletcher. “Europe’s demand for Russian gas grows,” Oil & Gas Journal (March 2005, Vol. 
103, Issue 9). 
52 
simply the use of military bases in these countries by United States, but have aided the 
Central Asian states with financial and military expertise. 
The United States claims that it is trying to foster economic reform in the region, 
as demonstrated by the democracy-building and economic assistance.  In theory this aid 
will, in time, lead to stability, and stability itself will lead to an increase in free trade, 
benefiting both the United States and the region as a whole.  A counter argument can be 
made regarding U.S. financial assistance to regimes that are “more attuned to 
authoritarianism,” leading to speculation that the United States is propping up these 
regimes in order to gain a foothold in this energy-rich environment.142   
The trend of U.S. foreign direct investment has been upward and has focused 
mostly on the oil sector in Kazakhstan, and on gold mining in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan.143  U. S. companies have partnered with Kazakhstan businesses on three 
major hydrocarbon ventures:  Chevron Corporation joined Kazakhstan in the 
development of the Tengiz field, Texaco joined Kazak businessmen in developing the 
Karachaganak oil fields, and a conglomerate of U.S. companies assisted Kazakhstan in 
the exploration and discovery of the vast Kashagan oil reserves in the Northern Caspian 
Sea.144  Another example of foreign investment is the Chase Manhattan Bank investing 
in the Kuntor gold-mine in Kyrgyzstan.145  The Central Asian states are dependent on 
foreign direct investment, and according to Stanislav Zhukov “…the influx of direct 
investment and loans from abroad has become the decisive factor in the economic growth 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.”146 
In addition, if the United States were interested only in acquiring the oil 
resources, there would be a very limited amount of assistance for economic development 
and democracy-building, especially when these governments are challenged with  
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corruption and poor infrastructure. Corruption and poor infrastructure are reasons of 
concern in trade relations and affect negatively the amount of foreign direct investment 
these countries can attract.147   
Trade between the United States and the Central Asian states has increased both 
in imports and in exports (see Figure 4).  According to the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) database, “Direction of Trade Statistics,” exports from the Central Asian region to 
the United States have steadily increased from 1992 to 2004.  .  The Central Asian states 
total export figures to the United States for 1994 were $139.9 million dollars, with an 
increase in 1999 to $291.4 million, and a total export to the United States in 2004 of 
$763.8 million dollars.  The same trend is observed with regards to the Central Asian 
states and U.S. imports; in 1994 there was $425.82 million dollars worth of goods 
imported, in 1999 it increased to $857.62 million, and in 2004 United States imported 
goods into Central Asia garnered just over $1 billion dollars.148  The United States’ 
interest in the region has continued to grow ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union; 
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Figure 4.   Central Asia and United States: Total Exports and Imports. 
 
D. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
After the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russian foreign policy paid little attention to 
economic integration with the Central Asian states.  Attempting to overcome its own 
economic crisis, Russia's economic policy in the region fluctuated from staying in Central 
Asia to leaving it altogether.149  After 1991, the Russian state was preoccupied with its 
own stability and showed little inclination to exert leadership in Central Asia.  Russia 
realized in 2000, however, that it could have a natural position of leadership in the region 
due to its geographical location linking Russia with the countries to the South for trade in 
various commodities from energy to cotton.150  In addition to its geographic location, 
Russia is interested in maintaining its economic links with the Russian Diasporas in the 
Central Asian countries.  These populations depend on Russian trade and economic 
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assistance and play a key part in Russian economic integration policies in the region.151  
The Russian Diaspora is important for economic integration because of its sheer size and 
level of education: in 2001, 11.7 percent of the Central Asian population was Russian, 
providing skilled work force (a majority of which were college educated), crucial for the 
economies in this region.152  
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept adopted and ratified by President Vladimir Putin 
in 2000, however, addressed the need for increased Russian integration with other 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  In his article, “Russian 
Foreign Policy Objectives in Central Asia,” Dmitry Trofimov, the Counselor of Foreign 
Policy Planning, states the five aims of this policy were: 1. The CIS was to become the 
priority for Russia; 2. National security brought to the forefront; 3. Individual approaches 
should be developed for each partner in the CIS; 4. Foreign policy focus should be on 
economic cooperation within CIS; and 5. Integration should be facilitated by means of 
bilateral agreements.153 
By 2004, Moscow’s major objectives in the Central Asian states were identified 
by Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee for Foreign 
Affairs: 
1. Help transform the Central Asian Republics (C.A.R.) into 
politically and economically viable states with friendly policies towards 
Russia. 
2. Strengthen Russia’s role in the system of intergovernmental 
political and economic relations. 
3. Extend and further institutionalize integration among the member 
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). 
4. Secure Russian economic interests in the region. 
5. Maintain Russian hold over regional energy resources, in addition 
to Caspian Sea oil transportation routes that will be advantageous to 
Russia. 
6. Counter the threat of religious extremism while encouraging the 
prevention of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. 
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7. Ensure Central Asia’s ecological security, especially concerning 
environmental disasters in the Aral and Caspian Seas. 
8. Protect the rights of Russians living in the region.154 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has determined that Russia needs to increase 
cooperation in Central Asia specifically in the energy and military sectors and has 
approved of several bilateral agreements.  In 2003 he signed an agreement with President 
Niyazov of Turkmenistan, which would supply Russia with gas for the next 25 years.  
The amount of gas shipped to Russia in 2004 was 200 billion cubic feet (12 percent of 
Turkmenistan’s gas production).  It is estimated that the rate will increase steadily to 2.8 
trillion cubic feet by 2009.155  Russia and Uzbekistan signed a Treaty of Strategic 
Partnership in 2004, increasing the amount of Russian military equipment supplied to 
Uzbekistan and the Russian contribution to modernizing and maintaining Uzbekistan’s 
military forces.  Uzbekistan is the most centrally located country in the region of Central 
Asia and the majority of transport routes for oil and gas pass through it.156  In January 
2004 Russia agreed to continue its lease of the Baikonur Space Center in Kazakhstan 
until 2050 for $115 million per year.  In addition, these two countries signed a border 
agreement in January 2005 (Russia and Kazakhstan share the longest land border in the 
world at 7,500 kilometers), which includes developing Kazakhstan’s second largest 
natural gas field in the Caspian Sea (i.e., Imashevskoye).  Under this agreement, Russia’s 
GazProm and Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz will have equal rights in the development of 
this field.157 
The head of the Russian Oil and Gas Union, Yuri Shafranik, wants Russia to 
increase its investment into production of hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan to $1 billion a 
year. Russia’s LUKoil and Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz signed a 40-year contract to 
share equally the production of oil from the Tyub-Karagen field (estimated to have 100 
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million tons in reserves) in the Caspian Sea.158  Russian shareholders currently control 44 
percent of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (see Figure 5), which runs from Kazakhstan 
to Novorossiysk and is capable of carrying 560,000 barrels per day.159  Naturally, Russia 
is interested in keeping the export of these natural resources safe during their transit 
across borders.  It is estimated that Kazakhstan has between 9 and 17.6 billion barrels of 
oil reserves and an additional 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  The 1500-kilometer 
pipeline being constructed and running from the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan to the 
Russian terminal in Novorossiysk further demonstrates Russia’s on-going interest in the 
region.160   
 
 
Figure 5.   Caspian Pipeline Consortium. 161  
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President Putin and Tajikistan’s President Imomali Rakhmonov have an 
agreement allowing basing rights for Russia in Tajikistan; this gives Russia its largest 
military presence abroad, with approximately 8,000 Russian troops from the 201st 
Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan.  These forces are serving as border 
security, aiding Tajik troops guarding its porous border with Afghanistan.  Tajikistan has 
been forgiven $240 million in debt to Russia for these basing rights.162  Both of these 
bilateral agreements are beneficial to Russia and are providing Russia with further 
leverage for economic integration.163 
According to the International Monetary Fund, almost no trade took place 
immediately following 1991 until 1994.  Russian trade with Central Asia declined from 
1994 to 1999, but increased steadily from 1999 to 2004.  Exports from Russia to the 
Central Asian states in 1994 were $2.85 billion, with imports fairly close behind at $2.37 
billion.  There was a substantial drop over the next 5-years, with 1999 Russian exports to 
Central Asia at $1.67 billion, and imports at $1.79 billion.  As stated earlier, these figures 
directly reflect Russia’s policy of letting its influence decline in the region.  This 
declining trend changed, however, with President Putin’s ratifying in 2000 the Foreign 
Policy Concept, which stated the need for more integration with CIS states.  The trade 
between Russia and the Central Asian states rose steadily, with Russian exports in 2004 
at $6.1 billion, and imports from the Central Asian states at $3.9 billion (as noted in 
Figure 6).   
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Figure 6.   Central Asia and Russia:  Total Exports and Imports. 
 
 
E. REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 
Until Russia is fully capable of providing greater economic integration in Central 
Asia, it has to continue to rely on organizations that already exist in the region.  In order 
to fully understand the impact these organizations may or may not have in the region with 
regards to economics, it is necessary to examine them.  Russia established the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (in 1991) and called for the participation of post-
Soviet influenced countries.  In 1993 the Agreement on the Formation of Economic 
Union was established with three major goals:  multilateral free trade agreement and 
customs union, common market, and a monetary union.  Indeed, an agreement for a 
Customs Union among the CIS countries was signed in 1995.  Another attempt at 
fostering economic trade and integration was the Free Trade Area, established in 1994 by 
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the CIS.  This agreement was an attempt to reduce regulations and trade barriers 
throughout the CIS; however, Russia is the only member not to have ratified the 
agreement.  Instead, Russia added several exclusions regarding oil and gas, and employs 
a quota system for precious metals and certain chemicals.164  This appears to be an 
attempt by Russia to dominate the economic trade within the region; by doing so, Russia 
is not adhering to the protocol of a true free trade agreement. 
The Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) established in 1994 was an attempt 
to improve both the economic and security situations without any outside assistance.  As 
it turns out, the CAEU was not effective in either security or economic reform.165  This 
organization is now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) and was joined 
by Russia in 2004; its goal is to achieve a free trade zone within the next 15 years.  
Initially a regional organization focusing on economic integration, Russia’s membership 
has brought new agendas to the organization including political and counter-terrorism 
programs.  Russia’s entering this organization suggests that President Putin wants to 
attain the geo-political and economic dominance Russia once had in the region (when it 
was part of the Soviet Union).  It has also been suggested that this organization will assist 
Russia in balancing against U.S. and Chinese influence in the region.166 
In 1999 an agreement on a Single Economic Space and Customs Union was 
introduced, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus.  This 
evolved in 2000 into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), based upon 
previous customs unions arranged between these countries.  Immediately following this 
free trade agreement, Russian exports increased 20-30 percent to the other EurAsEC 
members.167  Yet another organization in the region, and probably the most vital in terms 
of economic integration, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  With the bolstering 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a true stepping-stone to developing  
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economic recovery in the region, Russia would once again show its desire to cooperate 
within an international framework, rather than being perceived, perhaps, as trying to 
dominate and direct Central Asian activities.   
Russia must continue participation in and increase its focus on the SCO for 
economic recovery in the region, which will in turn benefit not only the Central Asian 
states, but Russia as well.  Founded in 1998, the SCO, initially known as the Shanghai 
Five (1996), has evolved into an organization whose members (China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) have a common interest both for security 
and now economics, within this region.  The evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, from strictly a border dispute organization to one more deeply involved in 
economic issues, is illustrated by the 2004 discussions among its members regarding an 
economic free trade zone.168  The SCO is the organization in which Russia and Central 
Asia need to focus their energies in order to attain greater security in this region, with the 
probability of developing stronger economic ties, and eventually, political and economic 
stability.   
F. CONCLUSION 
Although trade has increased among the Central Asian states since their 
independence, it has been very slight, with only three of the five countries having an 
overall increase since 1999: Kazakhstan had the largest increase from $185.5 million in 
1999 to $559.43 million in 2004, Kyrgyzstan’s trade increased from $103.7 million in 
1999 to $120 million in 2004, and Turkmenistan’s increase over the same time period 
was just $12 million dollars.  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan’s trade decreased over the same 
period, from $189.7 to $81.3 in Tajikistan and $410.4 to $361.6 in Uzbekistan.  The total 
for trade among the Central Asian states in 1994 was $828.7 million, increasing slightly 
in 1999 to $926.6 million, and for 2004 the total trade reached $1.1 billion dollars.169  
This slow rate of trade over the past decade is significant, as it indicates limited growth in 
the region.   
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In terms of regional balance of power, Russia views Central Asia as its ‘backyard’ 
and may want to maintain a strategic buffer zone to diminish U.S., Europe (NATO), and 
eventually Chinese influence.  Besides the oil and gas production in Central Asia, Russia 
needs markets for its products and Central Asia offers the potential for these exports, as 
well as a route to destinations South of this region.  Unfortunately, land-locked Central 
Asia suffers from its geography and the distance to current transportation hubs.  For 
increased market integration, Central Asia must improve the infrastructure it inherited. 
The economic situation of the individual states in Central Asia varies somewhat, 
but all have fairly high unemployment and inflation rates.  The lowest rate of 
unemployment is in Kazakhstan, with 8.3 percent of a 15 million population (2004), and 
the highest is in Uzbekistan, with approximately 25 percent in a 25.8 million population 
(1998).  The rate of inflation for Central Asia recorded (officially) for 2004 was between 
7.5 percent and 13.9 percent with some unofficial estimates by IMF reaching 18 
percent.170 
With increased capital investment into large-scale infrastructure projects, the 
conditions of the respective economies in Central Asia might become such that foreign 
direct investment would increase, assisting with more pipelines, roads, and other 
infrastructure.  If Central Asia is ever to reduce its reliance on foreign governments and 
achieve better economic integration, there should be a greater emphasis placed upon 
more large-scale regional projects (among and within the different Central Asian 
states).171  Unfortunately, this region does not itself currently possess the financial power 
to correct its inherent weaknesses of infrastructure.   
Stabilization and economic growth in Central Asia must continue to rely on 
foreign assistance in the short-term until this region is capable on its own of constructing 
a strong regional economic foundation.  The economic situation of the early 1990s was 
characterized by a severe decline in gross domestic product in the Central Asian 
countries; however, in the late 1990s with increased foreign direct investment this region 
showed a recovery in its GDP.  The gross domestic product in Central Asia continues to 
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rise today, and, in fact, in 2000 had risen 15-30 percent throughout the region.  This rise 
in GDP, according to Stanislav Zhukov, is due directly to the amount of foreign direct 
investment received starting in the late 1990s.172  Zhukov goes on to state that this 
upward trend in gross domestic product will continue in Central Asia only with outside 
assistance.  He gives a conservative date for full economic recovery in Central Asia of 
somewhere between 2014-15, with at least a continued three percent annual rise in gross 
domestic product.173  In the meantime, Central Asia must balance the influence of both 
the United States and Russia over its vast and valuable assets, namely, its natural 
resources. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As discussed throughout this thesis, the Central Asian states remain a focus of 
international interest not only due to the large amounts of natural resources, but also due 
to the region’s location (i.e., trade and its proximity for counterterrorism operations).  
The existing relationship between the Central Asian states and both the United States and 
Russia is economically beneficial, as demonstrated in the last chapter, and productive 
economies aid in leading the region to stability.  The United States and Russia are very 
concerned with the overall stability of Central Asia, including regional flashpoints, the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and maintaining the growing economic interests.   
With regard to regional flashpoints, the Central Asian states have made some 
efforts and progress, but problems continue and prospects are not good without the 
involvement of outside actors.  One example of a continuing issue is the unresolved 
status of Bagys, a village located in Kazakhstan, but under the economic control of 
Uzbekistan.  Border demarcation in Bagys is still unclear and unsettled with no apparent 
resolution on the horizon.  These types of conflicts exist throughout the region with little 
hope of resolution without outside assistance.  The volatile border disputes in the 
Ferghana Valley region are the most pressing and difficult for Central Asia to resolve and 
remain a potential flashpoint for conflict.  Minorities in the different enclaves continue to 
be an ongoing critical matter as they resent separation from their respective home 
countries, and endure complete isolation.  Russia, leading the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization towards regional commitment and stability, should take the lead and assist 
the Central Asian states with this problem.   
Water issues as well remain a point of contention in the region, especially with 
regard to the agricultural production.  The availability of potable water poses a serious 
issue in the region since a greater share of the water is being directed towards agriculture.  
The magnitude of this problem cannot be overlooked, as demonstrated by Uzbekistan’s 
war game, in which preparations for an attack against Kyrgyzstan were the basis of the  
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exercise scenario.  With assistance and pressure by Russia and its influence on the SCO, 
these border and water disputes have the prospect of being contained and eventually 
solved. 
The emplacing of land mines by Uzbekistan on its border with Tajikistan is 
another cause of regional border tensions.  Land mines remain an open issue and in the 
meantime, the mining of the border is preventing the transfer of trade throughout the area, 
severely effecting economies.  Currently, the United States has the opportunity to assist 
Central Asia with demining operations and should, in fact, press for increased presence to 
this end.  Since 1993, the United States has established humanitarian demining programs 
in forty-four countries, spending approximately $600 million dollars.  In 2002 the United 
States assisted in demining operations in Afghanistan through a number of means.  In 
addition to donations of $3.5 million dollars, experts were able to reach approximately 
seven million Afghanis by briefing them on the dangers of mines and demining 
operations.  The actual number of landmines cleared or destroyed was approximately 
210,000, clearing roughly 244 square kilometers of territory.174  The United States can 
focus its attention on Central Asia not only with the government NADR fund 
(Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and related Program), but also with civilian 
community organizations like RONCO, a demining organization assisting with demining 
operations throughout the world.175   
The second area of concern for Central Asian stability is the reconstitution of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the increase in activity among Hizb ut-Tahrir 
throughout the region; both of these occurrences pose a significant challenge for the 
Central Asian states.  Past violence in the region and the current trend of disaffected 
youth will lead to further violence if there is no assistance from the United States and 
Russia.  The United States is able to offer expertise in counterterrorism to Central Asia 
with regard to training and threat analysis, which in turn will aid in stability.  Russia’s 
close proximity, and its influence as a leading member of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization can assist also with focusing this organization’s assets on counterterrorism.  
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There are three reasons the SCO in particular has worked well and will continue to be 
successful in the region: “shared norms, shared interest, and a progressive approach.”176    
With the concern for spillover into its borders, Russia needs to work with the Central 
Asian states at forming a combined counterterrorism organization, to include the United 
States.  By working together, Central Asia, Russia, and the United States can quell further 
Islamic fundamentalism in the region from spreading, as well as reducing the number of 
actors these states must contend with in the region.       
The third and most crucial factor in the stabilization of Central Asia is the 
economy.   These countries do not have the financial resources that will allow them to 
increase expenditures for security and counterterrorism.  Thus, outside influence is 
essential; the United States and Russia bring not only expertise and assets to the table, 
they bring much-needed funds to support the critical counterterrorism operations.177  
Central Asia must continue and expand its policy of encouraging both the United States 
and Russia to participate in the affairs of the region if it is to stabilize its economies, as 
well as modernize infrastructure and reduce unemployment.  Citing the conservative 
estimate for economic recovery, as detailed in Chapter IV, Central Asia has another 
decade of relying on outside assistance before it can achieve true stability.  The Central 
Asian states must recognize that 15 years after independence from the former Soviet 
Union, and with the aforementioned issues of border disputes, Islamic fundamentalism, 
and weak economies still unresolved, it is vital to rely on outside assistance if regional 
stability is to materialize.  With the interim assistance of the United States and Russia, the 
Central Asian Silk Road has the potential to regain its previous importance.  By 
disregarding and discounting outside assistance, the Silk Road will not be known for its 
trade of natural resources, but instead will be infamous as a trade route for terrorism, 
narco-trafficking, and instability.  
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